The expectation that Chinese apparel and textile exports will swamp the U.S. and EU retail markets now that international quotas on those products have been eliminated has fueled much of the discussion of the future of these industries. Although imports from China have surged since the elimination of quotas on January 1, 2005, this conventional wisdom masks important choices that remain for public and private policies over time. In particular, two factors will continue to have major effects on the location of apparel and textile production going forward. First, public policy choices will continue to influence sourcing location, in particular as they relate to tariffs and regional trade polices as well as policies affecting the linkages between countries. Second, the lean retailing model that now prevails requires apparel suppliers to replenish basic and fashion basic products on a weekly basis. As that retailing model became dominant in the 1990s, so too did the advantage of sourcing these apparel items closer to the U.S. market so that products could be manufactured and delivered more rapidly from a smaller finished goods inventory. Even though costs remain a driving factor, we show that proximity advantages for certain classes of products will continue in a post-quota world as retailers raise the bar ever higher on the responsiveness and flexibility required of their suppliers.
This article considers the impact of quota removal in light of the new market forces cited above, particularly changes in the relation of retail-apparel-textile supply chains, and the continuing role of public policies affecting trade flows. In doing so, we argue that the volitional choices of private and public actors remain important in the postquota era. These choices will affect future market share for apparel suppliers in close proximity to the U.S. (e.g. Mexico, Caribbean, and Central American nations) and EU (e.g. Eastern Europe, northern Africa, and Mediterranean nations) markets, as well as employment within the U.S. and EU textile and apparel sectors. These choices will also impact the fate of other developed and developing nations hoping to sustain or improve their nation's competitive positions in a quota-less world.
II. Background

The Rise of the Global Market
Since the production of mechanical sewing machines in the 1850's, sewing apparel products has always been and remains a labor-intensive activity with small capital investment requirements. As a result, developing countries have seen the export of apparel products as a major pathway of economic growth. After WWII, international trade in apparel began to expand with more reliable shipping and better communications.
More clothing sold in the U.S. was made offshore, continuing the long-standing trend of manufacturers seeking out the low-cost supplier. This shift, however, was limited by various international agreements capping textile and apparel imports into the U.S. and the EU. These agreements allowed product specific import quotas for each country to exist while allowing yearly increases in the quota quantities. In 1995 a World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was signed creating a ten-year plan phasing out quotas in four discrete steps, the last step to be taken on January 1, 2005 with the elimination of all quotas among WTO member nations. This last step was by far the most important and potentially disruptive since nearly 50 percent of the volume of U.S. apparel imports were still under quota restrictions in December
2004.
One of the clear intentions of the ATC was to cushion and delay the major impact of quota elimination. Besides the disproportionate near-50% of volume protected prior to the fourth and final phase, the impact of that final stage was exaggerated because importing nations were careful through the first ten years to remove quotas largely on the lower value products, thus protecting their own value-added clothing industries. Thus, prior to 2005, each producing nation had yet to witness the brunt of quota removal on any major product groups vital to its domestic industry. For the U.S., this meant every notable category, including cotton pants, shirts, and T-shirts did not lose quota protection until this final stage took effect on January 1, 2005. (Abernathy, Volpe and Weil, 2004) 
Tariffs and Regional Trade Agreements
Although quotas ended on December 31, 2004 under terms of the ATC, tariffs established within the ornate system of bilateral apparel and textile agreements between countries will remain for a long time. Tariff agreements are then overlaid by an equally complex set of regional trade agreements that provide participants with full or partial relief from their partners' standard tariff rates on certain products under certain conditions. (Chiron 2004) . As a result, particular supplier nations with duty free benefits may enjoy a substantial competitive advantage over competitors excluded from similar arrangements.
For the U.S., the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the most widely known regional treaty. Signed in 1994, NAFTA has eliminated quotas and tariffs on most apparel moving between member countries, provided the products were assembled from fabric whose yarn originating in a member country. On August 2, 2005, President Bush signed the CAFTA-DR agreement that allowed apparel produced in the Central American nations and the Dominican Republic, under a U.S. yarn forward rule, to enter the U.S. duty free. Besides these and other regional treaties, the U.S. has engaged in separate bi-lateral agreements with Israel, Jordan and others that ultimately provided some combination of duty or quota relief to producers in these partner nations.
The EU, for its part, has its own complex web of trade agreements. Like the U.S.
the greatest benefits seem reserved for nations in close proximity to the European market and the world's under-developed regions. Three arrangements illustrating this all provide duty free and quota free access to the EU apparel market: the Euro-Mediterranean Least Developed Countries.
The Special Case of China
When China sought to become a WTO member in the late 1990s, one of the major issues in contention in the "accession" agreement was apparel and textiles. Under a separate Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and China, a bilateral consultation mechanism remains in affect for four additional years beyond the end of quotas for WTO countries (through December 31, 2008) . This safeguard mechanism allows the U.S. to seek to extend quotas with China for specific goods where the elimination of such restrictions would result in "…market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly development of trade between the two countries…" (USITC 1999: 8-12 
III.
The Structure of Global Sourcing
The Textile and Apparel Industry Today The drivers for sourcing will be discussed below, but it is worth pointing out here both the national diversity of import sources, and also the concentration in certain areas, particularly Mexico, so-called Caribbean Basin nations (a grouping that also includes Central America) and China and Asian sources.
Not surprisingly, the growth in apparel imports has been accompanied by a steady reduction in both U.S. employment and output within the apparel and textile sectors.
From the period 1989-2002, textile production in real dollar output terms declined by an average of 3.3% per year and apparel production by about 3.4%. Employment declined even more rapidly during those periods for both textile and apparel, reflecting both shifts towards domestic production of higher value products and increases in productivity, particularly for the textile industry (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, various years). Despite these declines, a large number of workers remain employed in both industries.
Sourcing Decision Makers
Discussion of the future of apparel and textile industries often focuses at this national level of trade flows. But these flows reflect decisions of private actors along supply chains (retailers, and producers of textiles and apparel) that operate within the restrictions of national and international trade and other public policies. One must understand how private decisions lead to observed flows of garments in order to forecast the post-2005 market only now taking shape.
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Making sourcing decisions in the global apparel market is a daunting task. Due to factors including language and custom barriers, communications hurdles, and the sheer 2 A study from 1993 by the U.S. Customs Service analyzing the top 100 apparel importers found that 48 percent of top importers were retailers; 22 percent designers; and about 20 percent U.S. based manufacturers. The remaining group were made up of wholesalers and other intermediaries not involved in either design, marketing, or production decisions (Feenstra 1998; Gereffi 1999) . Wholesale intermediaries declined further as a group in the supply chains with the rise of lean retailing (Abernathy et. al. 1999) . (major retailers and apparel companies) and an international supply network (Loveman, and O'Connell 1996; Fung 1998; Tanner 1999; Hagel and Brown 2001. Li & Fung was founded in 1906, originally as an exporting agent of porcelain and silk from China.
Following World War II, it began to focus on export of garments, toys, and other manufactured goods. As an important element of its garment exporting business, the company gained expertise in buying and selling quotas from Asian markets for shipment into the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s. As a buying agent and broker in quotas, it established relationships with more than 2000 Asian suppliers and links forward in the supply chain to manufacturers and retailers. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the company took advantage of its network of Asian suppliers and its growing facility with logistic management to offer U.S. retailers an efficient means of sourcing products in Asian nations through the auspices of Li & Fung (Fung 1998 Given the fact that not all apparel products require the same amount of labor, the benefit arising from low wages is magnified on labor-intensive products. This can be seen in comparing labor costs across different types of garments and sources of production. Table 2 compares the factor costs associated with producing two types of garments: a single pair of men's jeans and a cotton rung spun T-shirt. We compare the cost of production in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Coastal China for each case.
Allowing for differences across the producers in terms of wages and productivity (labor cost per garment), China's low wage rate still leads it to have the lowest cost associated with cutting, assembling and finishing the garment relative to the other two cases.
Of course, labor costs alone do not determine the total cost of an apparel product landing on U.S. shelves. A second factor cost highlighted in Table 2 is the price of procuring fabric. In fact, this expenditure may be even more responsible for variation among different supply sources than labor, as it is for jeans. Clearly, producers in close proximity to cotton textile manufacturers have an advantage over those far away. For example, it is more costly to utilize American denim in Colombian jeans factories than in Mexican shops. Furthermore, proximity to inexpensive textiles is an even greater advantage. China, for example, which has a growing cotton textile industry of its own, is able to secure lower cost fabric than its competitors using U.S. fabric.
Shipping cost is the final major factor cost associated with apparel imports.
Proximity to retail markets in the U.S. or EU matters in this elementary regard, at the very least. (Later it will be shown how it matters even more for other reasons.) Although the $.05 per garment difference between shipping a pair of jeans from Mexico rather than China may at first seem insignificant, it may not always be so, especially in the case of inexpensive products where the difference represents a meaningful percentage of the product's overall cost.
So after considering the labor, material, and freight, it is easy to suggest that countries like India, China and their neighbors could grow to dominate the U.S. market now that quotas no longer restrict them. This seems even more plausible for products such as dresses, where the cost variation is especially large. Despite the distance from the U.S., any shipping cost disadvantage is quickly erased for these producers through the combination of low wages and inexpensive fabric from local textile makers.
Direct Policy Costs
The total cost for a pair of jeans landing on U.S. soil does not end with the components listed in Table 2 . In fact, the policy costs enumerated in Table 3 can often comprise the largest cost differentials among producers. In the jeans example, duty and quota charges accounted for 46% of the total landed cost of a coastal Chinese producer in
2003.
The first policy cost illustrated in Table 3 arises from quotas. Under the former system, each nation determined the method for distributing the quotas it has available given its bilateral agreements with trading partners (Krishna and Hui Tan 1998) . For low wage countries with excess capacity, quota volume into the lucrative U.S. or EU markets became a source of revenue as well as opportunity to attract additional companies seeking sourcing opportunities. As a result, global manufacturers seeking to fill U.S.
retailer orders from a producer in China paid substantial fees for acquiring quota. As a result, prior to 2005, Mexico and Nicaragua were lower cost suppliers of jeans relative to China due to their preferential treatment under regional trade agreements (Table 3) .
Although quota-related costs initially dropped out of the equation after January 1, 2005, the newly active U.S. safeguards will likely re-introduce such costs. It is also worth reiterating that tariffs have and will remain in place. Table 3 makes it clear that this second policy-driven expense can also be influential, as duty rates on U.S.-bound apparel can reach as high as 30%. This can provide a considerable advantage to countries covered by regional trade agreements like those discussed earlier which reduce or eliminate this expense. In the case of jeans presented here, even without quota costs, Mexico pulls to within 1% of China because of its membership in NAFTA. For T-Shirts, the $0.29 duty that applies to Chinese imports dramatically changes the analysis. This same pattern would be recognized in the total cost supplier comparisons for a significant number of apparel products. Furthermore, because most of the countries partnered in U.S. trade agreements come from the Western Hemisphere, the net effect of the current U.S. tariff structure is a shift in market share toward Mexico, the Caribbean Basin and South
America for the many products fitting this cost profile. Likewise, European imports of these same products will likely originate in neighboring Mediterranean countries or leastdeveloped nations such as Bangladesh. Again, this factor did not disappear on January 1, insuring that many products will continue to be supplied according to pre-2005 trends, and that products from more proximate sources will remain competitive.
Lean Retailing and Replenishment
The factor costs and policy costs described thus far once may have been the only forces driving international retailers' and manufacturers' sourcing decisions. As the role of manufacturers in the supply chain has changed, though, so too has their objectives.
Many of these changes have been customer driven; that is to say, retailers are undergoing revolutionary changes of their own, and in turn, demanding more from their suppliers.
Modern retailers no longer have warehouses full of apparel products ready for the selling floor. Rather they have become "lean retailers" owning just the products on the selling floor. As a result, suppliers' warehouses and distribution centers act in many ways as virtual warehouses and distribution centers for the retailers. At least once a week, most often on Sunday evening after the weekend sales are known, retailers have their computer inventory system order replenishment products from their suppliers.
Products are ordered at the stock keeping unit (SKU) level. For example, an order will be placed with a manufacturer for a specific number of their men's jeans of a given style, color, fabric weight and finishing treatment, waist size and inseam length. The order goes to the manufacturer's computer and is generally received on that Sunday evening.
The retail order requires that the jeans be placed in identified cartons for each of the retailer's stores, and the order is to be delivered to the appropriate retailer's distribution center by Wednesday of the same week. The cartons must be identified with the appropriate bar codes identifying the specific store to which it is to go. The jeans must be floor-ready, that is, they must be ready to be placed on the retailer's floor with appropriate price marked as they are taken from the packing carton. In all likelihood the jeans will not be touched from the time they are placed in the shipping container at the manufacturer's distribution center until they arrive at the store ready to be placed on a table for sale on Thursday morning. In fact, the outside of the carton will be touched only when truck trailers are loaded and unloaded. The sorting from supplier's trailer to trailer destined for specific stores is fully automatic.
The processes and the paperwork associated with the products must be completely understood by the manufacturer and the retailers and conform to well known industrial standards. These added services place significant new costs on suppliers, in essence shifting risk from retailers backwards onto their suppliers (Abernathy et. al. 1999 ).
For the supplier, this evolving role in the supply chain has led to an increased focus on inventory carrying costs and risks, and manufacturers making global sourcing decisions have begun to account for these expenses (Abernathy et. al. 2000) . Table 4 carries forward the ongoing jeans and T-shirt examples by including these supply chainrelated factors (and uses total landed cost less quota cost as the basis of comparison since
we are concerned about the post-2005 period). First, consider men's jeans, where the typical Mexican, Caribbean and Coastal Chinese supplier will have lead times of three, five, and eleven weeks, respectively. Assuming shipments arrive at the manufacturer's distribution center from all three candidates with the same or nearly the same frequency, the variation in cycle time will surface in three important operating metrics.
The most obvious of these is the work-in-process inventory (WIP), which increases with the lead time on a direct basis. WIP costs are carried by the supplier and represent capital tied up in the production process itself. Given the low capitalization of many apparel suppliers, the consequences of large amounts of WIP can be substantial, and born increasingly by companies upstream of retailers and branded apparel producers.
As a result, the associated WIP carrying costs for sourcing the Chinese producer will be nearly three times those incurred when using the Mexican producer ($.11 per garment for Mexico versus $.30 for China).
Next, when planning safety stocks necessary for insuring against inevitable fluctuations in demand, a longer cycle time translates into larger finished-goods inventories (FGI). To illustrate this, consider the branded jeans manufacturer supplying products to a number of retail outlets, where from week to week, demand may vary from expected volumes. Depending on the producer's lead time, special orders aimed at replenishing a particularly popular SKU may or may not arrive in time for the manufacturer to achieve the negotiated fill rates with the retailer. So to assure high service levels, the manufacturer is forced to hold FGI in amounts adequate to service these fluctuations. In other words, longer cycle times equate to delayed responsiveness to the market, which ultimately necessitates higher safety stocks. Hence, a decision to contract the Chinese producer in Table 4 means keeping two or three additional weeks worth of FGI than if the western suppliers were chosen.
Inventory-at-risk is the final operating metric to reflect the variance in cycle times. Unlike WIP cost and FGI cost, it does not easily translate to the total cost buildup in Table 4 (see also Abernathy et al. 2000; Bouhia and Abernathy 2004) . But the potential costs represented by inventory at risk are considerable, perhaps larger than many of the more direct costs. This is because the possibilities of unanticipated product obsolescence or cancellation at any time during a product life-cycle means that the current inventory, or some part of it, must be sold at a deeply discounted level or, in the worst case, may never be sold at all. A sudden drop in the demand for a line of goods means that a supplier faces liquidating 15 or more weeks of product, simply because it cannot "turn off the tap" of supply instantaneously. For the decision-making manufacturer who stands to lose in this situation, lower inventory-at-risk is an added incentive to choose the shorter-cycle producers in Mexico or Nicaragua.
In the comparative analysis in Table 4 , the value at risk for a supplier of jeans is substantial. For example, if a retailer's weekly order of 10,000 units of a specific line of jeans is abruptly terminated, the manufacturer is left holding $650,000 of inventory that must be liquidated if sourced from Mexico versus $1.42 million if sourced from China.
For a manufacturer or sourcing agent seeking producers of jeans bound for the U.S., the sourcing decision may seem ambiguous when looking only at factor costs. As the example suggests, the preferred producer for this product does not surface until the impact of proximity is taken into account by determining the work-in-process and finished-goods inventory costs, as well as the inventory at risk. What may have gone unnoticed, though, are the specific characteristics of jeans that played such a vital role in this result.
The above discussion highlights the importance of taking product characteristics into account when projecting future sourcing patterns. More specifically, a product's fashion content, which is highly correlated with its level of replenishment, is a very influential factor in manufacturers' production decisions. For fashion products like the dress, the decision will lean more heavily on factor and policy costs. This means low wage nations, and especially those with access to inexpensive textiles, have the potential for major market gains as quotas are removed. On the other hand, for replenishment products, it would seem that producers in close proximity to the world's major markets remain on solid footing even without the lowest wage rates. Not surprisingly, these trends are already being reflected in current international sourcing patterns.
IV. Implications for post-2005 sourcing patterns
Apparel
The forgoing argument implies that the prospects for apparel sourcing into the U.S. and EU markets will be driven by two sets of forces. For products with single seasons and limited prospect for replenishment such as dresses, women's blouses, and fashion sensitive clothing in general, traditional cost factors, and the continuing cost of tariffs will frame sourcing decisions. For these goods, future competitiveness will change dramatically for those countries whose garment industry depended on quota-driven advantages (for example as a low-cost portal for quota-constrained suppliers), or whose cost advantages were only somewhat above the costs of purchasing quotas. For these countries, the end of quotas implies the kind of head-to-head competition implied by the conventional wisdom, albeit along a broader set of factors than just labor costs. For example, quota-constrained producer nations like India, already successful in the market due to lower combined manufacturing and policy costs, stand to expand market share Of course, there are other factors affecting sourcing decisions. These include quality of the basic fabric (e.g. cashmere), specialization in production and design (e.g.
Italian suits), and certain highly skilled sewing details (e.g. complex stitching patterns).
These characteristics tend to arise from historic specialization not easily replicated. We focus here on more generic factors.
The clothing produced in U.S. and EU markets are composed of a mix of replenishable and non-replenishable products. Although the level of replenishment required by retailers varies across segments (mass merchants demand a higher level of replenishment, albeit for a more narrow product mix than department stores for example) Figure 3 provides an indication of the extent and variety of replenishment products for different types of apparel for a major U.S. department store.
A comparison of the replenishment content of all garment products shipped for major sources of production provides evidence consistent with the importance of replenishment products for sources of production more proximate to the U.S. and E.U (Tables 5(a) and 5(b)). As predicted, the U.S. market was lead by Mexico, which enjoys a beneficial policy position through NAFTA (no tariffs) and the closest proximity.
Additionally, a number of regional CBPTA countries were high-volume partners. China was well down the list, and its focus for the category was on more fashionable styles as evidenced by its higher unit cost ($ per dozen). Bangladesh topped the EU list of suppliers, parlaying its very low wage rate with its preferential tariff treatment as a least developed nation. Yet a high number of Mediterranean nations also made the list. The very different composition of apparel sources for jeans into the U.S. and EU market is telling, implying that the decisions leading to current sourcing patterns are balancing a much wider set of factors than lowest manufacturing costs.
Since quotas were lifted to begin 2005, it is clear from Table 5 market, comprising 60 percent of all imports of that category, were neighboring countries (Honduras, Mexico, El Salvador and Dominican Republic). A number of nations with comparable or lower unit prices for T-shirts (Bangladesh, Egypt, Thailand) fell low in the list of sources even though they were not quota constrained for that product category.
The EU list was comprised of both Asian sources of production (particularly Bangladesh which has preferential tariff treatment) as well as regional producers like Turkey, and
Morocco. The 2005 year-to-date data (Table 6 (C)) reflects a quota-free market, and yet, Western nations are still responsible for more than 80% of the T-shirts imported into the U.S.
In contrast, consider sourcing for dresses. Fashion items, which are expensive to produce and not typically replenished, would presumably have similar supply patterns into both the U.S. and EU. This is due to the fact that factor costs play a large role and the inventory and risk considerations are non-discriminating. Tables 7(a) and 7(b) support this assertion. For the U.S., none of the proximate nations that dominate the men's jeans list appear in the top 10 of sources for cotton dresses, and many countries that do not even appear in Table 5 (a) appear near the top of 7(a) (e.g. India and Sri Lanka). The national sources of cotton dresses into the EU look more similar to those supplying jeans.
The overlap between U.S. and EU sources is far greater here, reflecting the dominance of more traditional drivers. Furthermore, Similarly, while about 22 percent of all apparel sources from Mexico and CBI nations is replenishable, less than 10 percent of products sourced in China or other Asian nations have this characteristic. Since these factors will still prove important after quotas are lifted, rapid shifts in sourcing to Asian and other low wage but distant nations are unlikely. As lean retailing practices take greater hold in Europe, the benefits from replenishment will also tend to favor products sourced in the low wage regions on the continent and from countries in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership -countries primarily bordering the Mediterranean Sea.
Textiles
The fate of the textile industry is closely tied to apparel. The use of U.S. textiles by suppliers working out of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean reflects as we have argued throughout the choices of private actors 3 It is not, however, as directly linked today as it once was. Textile products are inputs for three very distinct industries: apparel, home furnishing, and industrial uses, each using roughly one-third of annual textile production. Home furnishing industry includes sheets, towels, carpets, and related products.
Industrial applications represent a varied set of uses from biotechnology applications (cardiac stents) to automotive interiors to large scale construction applications such as the tent-like structures used as roofing for the Denver International Airport. See Abernathy et. al. 1999 , chapter 11 for a complete discussion.
operating within the bounds of public policies and institutions. It is reflective of public policies such as the terms of the Caribbean Basin Partnership Trade Act that requires as a quid pro quo for duty-free entrance into the U.S. market that products sewn in Central America and the Caribbean utilize American textiles. But it also arises because of the proximity, quality, and cost of U.S. textile products that have made U.S. an attractive source for Mexico even though under NAFTA duty-free treatment would be granted if textiles originated in Mexico. The continuing effects of regional trade agreements reducing relative tariffs and proximity advantages mean that significant demand for U.S.
products should remain in the medium term, providing that both apparel and textile providers take continuing advantage of the proximity premium. Equally, the backward linkage from apparel to textiles means that regional trade policies (e.g. the Central
American Free Trade Act) may be especially important for that sector.
A further implication of these trade figures is the longer term opportunity for
Mexico to further expand its textile sector. Along with increasing Mexican investment in textile production, many major U.S. textile companies have moved capital there. Yet the obstacles to developing a high quality, technologically advanced textile sector are much more substantial than for apparel. Textile production is a far more capital intensive process requiring development of infrastructure, electricity, water, and the management of sophisticated manufacturing processes. Thus, the development of a major textile sector in Mexico and its attendant effects on the U.S. industry will occur over a longer period of time. It is less clear that the CBI nations will be able to develop a textile sector in the near term for several reasons. First, CAFTA still requires use of textile products manufactured in the U.S. (unlike NAFTA where there is no such precondition for apparel imported from Mexico). Second, capital constraints are more substantial in the CBI nations than in Mexico. Finally, the CBI apparel manufacturers currently in operation have specialized primarily in assembly. There is therefore less experience in the management of more complex apparel manufacturing than one finds in Mexico, limiting the supply of skilled managers for textile operations.
V. Conclusion
The The ultimate impact of the removal of quotas on the global network of firms supplying the U.S. and European markets rests on volitional choices taken by private players along the supply chain and public entities in developed and developing nations in light of these complex factors. Rather than a preordained future driven by inexorable forces, we believe that informed choices taken at the private and public level powerfully affect those who will win and lose in the next decade.
Private Choices
We have argued that the competitive strategies and choices of retailers, apparel manufacturers, and textile producers will have a major impact on the location of production for different types of products. The continuing importance of logistic connections between the manufacturing and distribution of clothing mean that supply chains will reflect a blend of considerations regarding factor prices, transportation costs and increasingly adjustments to the risks associated with sourcing products in different locations. As supply chain decision-makers adopt better means of pricing these risks as has happened in other markets, it will play an even larger role in sourcing activities. The Textile manufacturers that supply regional and U.S. apparel producers have survived by a combination of the preferential treatment of domestic fabrics and through investing in technology at the spinning, weaving, and finishing steps of production thus allowing them to achieve some of the highest productivity and quality in the world. In addition, many producers have developed significant brand recognition, creating distinctive products such as Polartec ® . Survival will require further progress in these areas as well as further improving their responsiveness to U.S. retailers and consumers.
Similarly, the apparel industries in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean will only maintain their position-even with tariff advantages-by continually improving the advantages arising from proximity. The quantity of shipments from Mexico and to a lesser extent from CBI nations has decreased since 2002, arising from the U.S. recession, trade-related impacts of the 9/11 attacks, and some substitution from other countries. It may also reflect, however, the lack of improvement in short cycle responsiveness among Mexican suppliers. Intrinsic advantages arising from physical proximity can be lost if those producers do not adjust manufacturing, information, and distribution practices to allow them to be responsive.
The private choices facing developing nations are therefore more complex than suggested by the common wisdom. Bair and Gereffi (2001, 2003) advocate that Mexico and other developing nations should focus on the design and marketing phases of apparel operation as a critical step towards survival. Although this strategy is very tempting, particularly because (as they point out) a great deal of the profits captured by the supply chain occur at the design and marketing end, it is not clear that they will successfully wrest these functions from retailers and major brands for this very reason. Instead, we believe that Mexican suppliers in Torreon and elsewhere will need to be able not only to provide the full package of product and services demanded by their powerful customers, but also do so in a manner that is sustainable for the companies. There is evidence that this has in fact happened in Mexico in recent years, leading to a very competitive but substantially restructured industry that contributes to Mexico's continuing supply of almost 50 percent of jeans imported into the U.S. (Rosenberg 2005 ). Yet adjustments of this kind are far from simple: We have seen many U.S. firms whose domestic operations were undermined as much by factor prices disadvantages as they were from their incapacity to manage risk effectively. Opportunities for countries in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and Turkey for taking advantage of proximity advantages into the EU require similar types of competitive strategies and adjustments (e.g. Pickles et al, 2005) .
The impact of replenishment and risk shifting in supply channels also alters the traditional role apparel and textile industries can play in developing nations. Apparel and textile sectors remain attractive industries in terms of economic development. But assuring the success of those industries has become more complex. It will be difficult for many nations with inadequate infrastructure, distant location from major consumer markets, or political (or even climactic) instability, who will be at a considerable competitive disadvantage for many apparel products, even if they have low wage rates.
Further, for those categories of apparel where replenishment is not a major factor in sourcing, the presence of a large number of countries with extensive apparel capacity means more intense competition among these nations for a smaller market of nonreplenishment products. Together, these forces will make the future of apparel industries reliant solely on low wages as the source of competitive advantage (e.g., Bangladesh) increasingly bleak and vulnerable to the removal of quotas. National public policies will therefore continue to have a major impact on a quota-free trading system. For nations hoping to expand their capacities, public policies that impact the links between their markets and U.S., EU, and other major consumer markets will be critical. For example, the port infrastructures in Bangladesh suffer from problems arising from physical geography, climatologic uncertainty, and enormous administrative problems. While the country has remained competitive due to its favorable trade status with the EU and low wages, Bangladesh's long term viability as a source of apparel and textiles rests on the adoption of public policies that appreciably lower trade costs associated with the administrative problems (including a significant problem of the integrity of those processes) and investments in infrastructures that dramatically reduce the time required to move goods in and out of the country.
Movement along these lines has been very limited in the view of a number of analysts (Rahman 2002; Bhattacharya and Rahman 2002) .
The very different fates of Bangladeshi T-shirts in the European and U.S. markets serve as a reminder of the continuing role that public policies will play in shaping sourcing patterns. Bangladesh, due to its status as a "Least Developed Nation", enjoys free entry into the EU on apparel that undergoes two stages of production. In the case of T-shirts, this is knitting and sewing, both well within the capability of Bangladeshi producers. As shown above, this competitive advantage allows the country to be the leading source of T-shirts into the EU, a status unrealized in the U.S. market where Mexico and Caribbean nations enjoy duty free T-shirt imports and Bangladesh does not.
Clearly, then, through the forging of bi-lateral and regional trade agreements that reduce or eliminate tariffs for certain trade partners, governments will retain the opportunity to impact global retailers' sourcing decisions.
Regional trade policies will also be important sources of public choices after
2005. Tariffs will remain in place for the foreseeable future. In fact, despite the reduction of tariffs that are part of the WTO, the end of quotas will further reduce national interest in removing those tariffs. Because they will continue to represent significant costs (see Table 3 ), regional agreements that provide tariff relief for signatory countries like NAFTA, CBTPA and AGOA for the U.S. and the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership for the EU will remain important instruments of public policies. Proximity effects further raise the ongoing benefits that may arise from regional arrangements.
We have cited our skepticism about the conventional wisdom throughout this essay. Although traditional factors and the ending of the quota system will impact the sourcing of products, we believe that mainstream predictions miss the mark in several respects-even in light of the immediate, post-quota surge of apparel imports from China. Even the most sophisticated efforts to forecast the post-2005 impacts have left out the replenishment dynamic. The USITC models of the effects of China's accession to the WTO on U.S. apparel production and employment are indicative. These models are run at the aggregate rather than commodity level, and therefore fail to capture compositional changes in the products traded between countries. The USITC report indirectly acknowledges this problem: "Finally, the simulations reflect the assumption that the purchasers' willingness to substitute imports for domestic production remains constant throughout the 12-year period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . This may not be the case. For example, if domestic producers were to shift production to specialized sub-sectors, imports could become less viable substitutes and, as a result, purchasers would be less responsive to changes in import prices." (USITC 1999, p. 8-20) .
Replenishment considerations arising from the new economics of distribution and production channels explain an important portion of the shifts in sourcing over the past decade. As lean retailing becomes even more widespread and suppliers more sophisticated in thinking about managing risk, replenishment considerations will factor even more heavily into sourcing decisions. This will make the countries with proximity more competitive for those goods where replenishment is important, and will subject those countries competing along traditional lines to greater competition over a smaller set of apparel products. As these economic factors will not disappear in coming yearsindeed, they will intensify--this driver of sourcing location will persist. Abernathy et. al. 2000; Bouhia and Abernathy 2004) . * Estimated replenishment value of imports from a particular country is determined as follows: The value of imports in each of the product classes defined in Figure 3 is multiplied by the respective replenishment percentage shown there. These 25 products are then summed together for a total replenishment value (vertical axis on left) and as a percent of total apparel exports from that country / area (vertical axis on right). 
